LINCOLN'S OWN STATE IN THE ELECTION OF 1860

BY
HAROLD PRESTON JAMES
B.S. in Ed., Ball State Teachers College, 1937
M.A., University of Illinois, 1940

AN ABSTRACT OF A THESIS
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN
HISTORY IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, 1943

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H.P.J.

LINCOLN'S OWN STATE IN THE ELECTION OF 1860

The career of Abraham Lincoln continues to be fascinating both to scholars and to men of the world. Events, trends, and motivations of his life lie upon the records of the past alluringly and partially revealed. His profound influence upon subsequent generations has induced the tenacious and popular concept of him as a mystic, legendary person; it has also stimulated investigation into the reasons for his rise to historical prominence. His enduring fame rests on the soundness and magnetism of his character and philosophy, but his honored position was achieved in politics. While reverent scholars perceive the hand of God in the progressive steps by which the Springfield lawyer came to pilot the ship of state through its most turbulent seas, others find the explanation of his rise to power in the clever manipulations of shrewd politicians whose opportunism blended somewhat imperceptibly with their adherence to moral and political principles.

The tall, ungainly Illinoisan burst upon national attention in the famous Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858, but his first notable success in politics came in 1860. He was defeated in the senatorial contest with Douglas, and the record of his previous terms in the state and national legislatures yields little indication that he was destined for renown. The election of 1860 ushered in Lincoln the statesman.

The political contest of that year bears historical significance beyond that of a crucial phase in the life of Lincoln. The tragic sequel to that canvass makes it one of the most important political episodes in the nation's history. It was the final battle of ballots preceding the battle of bullets. Lincoln, chosen titular head of the United States, was called to the tremendous task of re-uniting a divided nation, to the perilous and uncertain subjugation of centrifugal forces let loose by decades of agitation over slavery and sectional rights. Po-

litical and economic antagonisms that formed the pattern of the "irrepressible conflict" yielded to the arbitrament of the sword on the bloody battlefields of the Civil War. What was done on the first Tuesday in November of 1860 was the decisive event that precipitated the cotton states into the series of acts culminating in the attack upon Fort Sumter.

A less dramatic consequence of the election, but one perhaps as vital in determining the course of national development, was the rise of the Republican party to control of the Federal government in subsequent decades. Thus, for the career of Lincoln, for the Civil War, and for the Republican party the campaign of 1860 was of primary significance.

Lincoln's own state played an interesting role in this contest. In many respects, the canvass was more meaningful to Illinois than to other states. Two Illinoisans were contenders for the presidency, Stephen A. Douglas of Chicago and Abraham Lincoln of Springfield, the latter becoming not only the first President from Illinois but also the first important one from the Old Northwest.[1] Moreover, the state, geographically wedged between North and South, commercially and culturally tied to both sections, and politically torn by the slavery controversy, reflected in miniature the dissensions of the nation.

Though it is natural to think of Lincoln as the central figure in the election of 1860, comprehensive study of his bid for the presidency embraces far more than his participation in it. Historical light, turned from the Republican presidential nominee and diffused impartially over the entire political panorama makes the role of the leading player more understandable in the perspective of stage and supporting cast. That Lincoln and his party emerged victors in Illinois is an easily ascertained fact, but the explanation of this triumph requires the more difficult correlation of personal, political, social, and economic factors.

Illinois was in a period of transition in 1860. There were lingering traces of the frontier; some areas were sparsely set-

1. William Henry Harrison, elected in 1840, served only one month of his term.

tled, most of its people still derived a livelihood directly from the soil, and such integral elements of refined civilization as education, sanitation, and the fine arts were woefully underdeveloped. Yet there had been remarkable growth, especially during the fifties, when population more than doubled to reach 1,711,951, towns grew in number and size, manufacturing developed, and almost three thousand miles of railroad were laid. Despite the cultural lag, Illinoisans were proud of their state and firmly convinced that the time had arrived when it should wield greater influence in the nation.

Participation of Illinoisans in national affairs had been increasing. Too new to statehood to take a notable part in the compromises of 1820, the influence of the state had enlarged until its congressmen were making themselves heard in the debates of the forties and fifties on the Wilmot proviso, fugitive slaves, and territorial policy. As chairman of the Senate committee on territories, Stephen A. Douglas achieved national prominence, and, with his Kansas-Nebraska bill of 1854 proposing non-intervention by Congress in the domestic affairs of Federal territories, wrote the opening paragraph in the final chapter of the slavery controversy.

While some of Douglas's constituents applauded, the more radical anti-slavery groups denounced his proposal; in his home city of Chicago, they burnt him in effigy. Free-Soilers in his own party revolted, and merging with members of the disintegrating Whig party, were strong enough in 1855 to elect an anti-Nebraska Democrat, Lyman Trumbull, to the United States Senate. In 1856, this composite of former political foes, ex-Whigs and ex-Democrats, won all the state offices by sizable majorities, though Douglas's party carried the eleven electoral votes. Douglas regained favor among his constituents when he denounced the attempt of the Buchanan administration to force slavery upon Kansas under the Lecompton constitution. In fact, the trend toward Douglas, motivated by a renewed belief that he favored free territories, reached the point where Eastern Republicans advised fellow partisans in Illinois to indorse his re-election in 1858.

Here Republican strategy shifted. Hoping to attract con-

servative voters, the young party had progressively modified its anti-slavery radicalism of 1856 until its policy tended to be identical with that of Douglas. Such a merger of ideas would have left the Republican party in Illinois without an excuse for existence and facing annihilation. Lincoln realized this danger. In his "house-divided" speech, launching the senatorial campaign of 1858, he injected new vitality unto Republicanism by denouncing Douglas's territorial theory and restating the radical idea that free and slave states could not continue to exist in the same Union, that eventually all must become one or the other. In the seven famous debates during this contest, Douglas forced Lincoln to explain more conservatively this anti-slavery pronouncement. Though the Republican candidate insisted upon congressional prohibition of slavery in the territories, he denied that he favored outright abolition and negro equality, or that he would bar new slave states from the Union. In the ensuing election, despite the fact that Lincoln's party won a popular majority in the state, Douglas was returned to the Senate.[2] The senatorial contest injured Douglas's chances for the presidency, however, for Lincoln lured him into the "Freeport heresy," the public statement of the doctrine of "unfriendly legislation" so unpopular with Southern Democrats.

If the contest of 1858 in Illinois may be considered dress rehearsal for the presidential campaign of 1860, the two leading players realized the need to alter political garbs. Douglas had to regain Southern favor. Lincoln had to clothe his anti-slavery attitude in phrases that would not offend the politically vital group of Illinoisans who disdained slavery agitation, feared disunion, and repelled abolitionism. In the interval between the two elections, Republicans stressed conservative viewpoints on slavery, Lincoln speaking several times in Ohio,

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2. Douglas was elected by the state legislature, fifty-four Democrats representing a popular vote of 122,308 supporting him, while forty-six Republicans representing a popular vote of 125,775 supported Lincoln. The southern, usually Democratic counties had the advantage of an unfair apportionment of legislative districts according to population. Edwin E. Sparks, ed., **The Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 1858,** Illinois State Historical Library, **Collections** (Springfield, 1908), III, 533.

New York, and New England in an effort to convince the electorate that Republican anti-slavery policy was based upon time-honored constitutional concepts. Douglas committed himself to the more difficult task of persuading the people of both North and South that the antagonistic desires of the two sections could be reconciled within the limits of his territorial proposals.

In Illinois, before the nominating conventions in 1860, there were divisions in both parties: radical and conservative Republicans, pro- and anti-Douglas Democrats. Radical Republicans of the northern counties favored William H. Seward of New York for President and Norman B. Judd of Chicago for governor. Conservative Republicans of the central counties favored Edward Bates, Missouri Whig, for President, and Richard Yates or Leonard Swett for governor. Lincoln was acceptable to both groups. Among the Democrats, the small but influential group of Buchanan-supported Danites[3] annoyed and embarrassed the pro-Douglas majority, especially in matters relating to the presidential nomination.

Though there was much prior consideration of candidates, platforms, and political strategy, the actual series of events that collectively may be called the campaign of 1860 was initiated at the Democratic national convention at Charleston, South Carolina, on Douglas's birthday, April 23. Two sets of Illinois delegates journeyed to this meeting, one pro- and one anti-Douglas. The Little Giant did not attend, but he was the central personality of the convention, with every delegate favoring or opposing his nomination. Fortunately for him, the convention rejected the Danite delegates; his campaign manager and his staunchest friends were in the delegation that was admitted. The proceedings reached a crisis when the pro-Southern majority report of the platform committee demanded Federal protection for slavery in the territories. Douglas's friends refused to budge from the minority report favoring popular sovereignty; therefore, several Southern delegates

3. The derisive term, "Danite," seems to have been taken from a despised Mormon group, and applied to the few Federal office-holders and pro-Southern Democrats who opposed Douglas in the elections of 1858 and 1860 in Illinois.

withdrew. The remaining delegates balloted fifty-seven times for a nominee, Douglas receiving a majority each time but never the two-thirds required by Democratic usage. The convention adjourned to meet again in Baltimore on June 18.

In the meantime, Illinois Republicans began their campaign. At Decatur on May 9, the successful state ticket was formed with Richard Yates for governor, Francis A. Hoffman for lieutenant-governor, and the incumbents, Ozias M. Hatch, William Butler, Jesse K. DuBois, and Newton Bateman for secretary of state, treasurer, auditor, and superintendent of public instruction respectively. A sensational incident of this convention furthered Lincoln's bid for nomination. By prior arrangement, John Hanks, an old friend of Lincoln, interrupted a session by carrying in two old rails with a Lincoln-for-President placard attached. The "electrical" effect upon the unsuspecting group supplied the inspiration needed to pass a resolution that Illinois delegates to the national convention vote as a unit for Lincoln. He was the "rail-splitter" candidate thereafter.

The Republican national convention met at Chicago on May 16, deliberated three days, enthusiastically constructed a platform, and nominated Abraham Lincoln on the third ballot. The pre-convention favorite, New York's Senator Seward, retained and even added to his initial strength throughout the balloting. Lincoln, however, advanced from 102 votes on the first ballot to 181 on the second and 231½ on the third, whereupon an Ohio delegate changed four votes to make the 233 necessary to choice. A moment's silence, then the tense audience turned to riotous, uncontrolled cheering. Men embraced, threw hats into the air, and fired cannon from the roof of the "wigwam" in which the convention was held. The nomination was then made unanimous and Hannibal Hamlin of Maine named for Vice-President. The Republican national ticket, like the Illinois state ticket, was formed with clever strategy, and defeated aspirants readily added their support.

Several factors account for Lincoln's nomination. He was regarded as most "available," that is, more acceptable to different shades of political opinion than were other candidates.

Seward was considered too radical and too closely identified with the "irrepressible conflict" to win the vital Whig vote in such doubtful states as Illinois, Indiana, and Pennsylvania. Bates was too conservative and too tolerant toward slaveholders to please the radicals and the Germans. Lincoln was an ex-Whig, a resident of a closely-contested area in a doubtful state, and his speeches were capable of both radical and conservative interpretation. Moreover, the site of the convention and the palaver and promises of his adroit and persistent managers won over other delegations to his nomination.

Though ex-Whigs believed Bates more "available," and many people in northern counties lamented the shelving of Seward, most Illinois Republicans enthusiastically accepted their nominee. Even a few Democrats were proud that an Illinoisan had been honored, despite efforts of the party's editors to divert attention from the contrast between their own misfortunes and the auspicious Republican beginnings. Lincoln himself humbly accepted the nomination, while Douglas's managers capitalized on the event to urge upon Democrats everywhere that only the Little Giant could defeat Honest Abe.

On June 13, the Douglas Democrats, meeting at Springfield, formed a state ticket with James C. Allen for governor and five other relatively obscure men for the remaining offices. On June 23, at the postponed national convention at Baltimore, Douglas was finally nominated for President. Thus was completed the naming of the major candidates in the Illinois campaign. The other parties, Southern Democrat and Constitutional Union, headed respectively by John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky and John Bell of Tennessee, exerted only minor influence in Illinois, though both named full state and electoral tickets.

The principal issue of the campaign was slavery, the focal point of controversy, as stated in the platforms, being the status of the institution in the territories.[4] In this common do-

4. Though the question of extending slavery into the territories was the focal point of acrimonious controversy, it was essentially unreal, the substance of the sectional quarrel lying in the determination of both North and South to keep or to gain control of the Federal government. Randall, J. G., "The Civil War Restudied," **Journal of Southern History,** (Baton Rouge, 1940), VI, 439-457.

main of the nation, Southern Democrats demanded Federal guarantees of the alleged constitutional right to hold and use slave property, while Republicans urged that neither Congress nor the territorial legislature could constitutionally establish slavery. Douglas's platform upheld non-intervention by Congress in the domestic affairs of the territories, but conceded that the "measure of restriction" to be placed upon slavery by the territorial legislature should be determined by the Supreme Court, then pro-Southern. The Constitutional Union, or Bell-Everett, platform avoided the issue. Breckinridge's platform, demanding Federal protection of "the rights of persons and property in the territories," was the most explicit in its wording on this point. The Republican anti-slavery plank was phrased vaguely in order to win both radical and conservative support. Douglas's platform was ambiguous and equivocal, designed to please both an anti- and a pro-slavery group.

This limited issue written into the platforms was expanded in the actual canvass to embrace more far-reaching aspects of the slavery question, such as abolition, racial equality, constitutional rights, and secession. Appealing to racial prejudice and to the fear of disunion and civil war, the Democrats reiterated the charge that Lincoln's party would establish "nigger equality" socially and politically, and drive the South to rebellion by trying to abolish slavery in the states as well as in the territories. Lincoln's followers endeavored to refute such accusations by citing their platform, the opinions of their leaders, and the denunciations of Republican conservatism by the extreme abolitionists themselves. Of course, many abolitionists supported the avowedly anti-slavery Republicans as the best immediate step toward "ultimate extinction," and this fact gave potency to the charges of the Democrats.

Republicans partially offset the effect of Democratic accusations by stressing Douglas's apparent inconsistencies. In a futile attempt to win the support of Southern politicians, the Little Giant weakened his most virile political argument. Republicans had found Douglas's theory of popular sovereignty hard to combat, for it was plausible, agreed with the basic

American concept of self-government, satisfied the average Illinoisan's preference for free over slave economy, and was operating, albeit falteringly, toward a free Kansas. Moreover, it seemed to avoid a direct and secession-stimulating affront to the South. That there was a recurring tendency for Republicans to be swallowed up by or drawn into Douglas's viewpoint was shown by Lincoln's many letters exhorting his fellow partisans to resist such temptation. In 1860, though Douglas eloquently advocated what he termed "my great principle," an item which he specifically approved in his platform undermined the strong appeal of popular sovereignty, and undoubtedly prevented thousands of Free-Soilers from voting for him. Predicted by its proponent to win thousands of Southern votes for Douglas, this so-called Wickliffe Resolution recognized the Supreme Court, then pro-Southern, as the sole arbiter in territorial questions. No longer need the Republicans combat the plausible non-intervention theory. Sporadically, they continued to attack it, but their principal assault upon Douglas shifted to this part of his platform. They insisted that he had abandoned popular sovereignty, that he was actually pro-slavery, and that his friendship for free territories was disproved by his acceptance of the pro-Southern resolution. The vulnerability of this futile concession to the slave-holders was recognized in Illinois, for while Republican editors denounced it daily, Douglas's leading editors positively refused even to print it.

Of course, many Illinoisans continued to follow Douglas because they believed his policy would promote free territories despite the Wickliffe Resolution. Moreover, throughout the campaign, Democratic leaders stressed the peril of Republicanism to the "glorious Union," and depicted the awful economic disruption and probable civil war that would occur if Lincoln were elected. This appeal to the fear of disunion was perhaps the most effective, and certainly the most used anti-Republican argument.

Certain economic proposals, which were not issues in the sense that the two major parties occupied opposite positions thereon, also affected the outcome of the contest. Republicans explicitly demanded a protective tariff, Federal funds for

river and harbor improvements, and passage of the homestead bill which the Democrats had defeated. Though the Democratic platforms ignored such proposals, Douglas conceded their general desirability, and frequently explained that they might have been adopted had not all of the available time in Congress been consumed by slavery agitators among his foes. The corruption of the outgoing administration was emphasized by the Republicans, denied by the Danites, and somewhat ignored by Douglas's followers. The tariff and internal improvements were little mentioned in Illinois except in the lake region. The homestead measure, 160 acres of free land to each actual settler, was the most publicized Republican proposal, and was a vital factor in that party's success. The slogan, "Vote yourself a farm," was almost unanswerable before the public. Douglas tried to identify himself with this popular measure, but his record on it in Congress had been faulty, and his platform ignored it.

Besides the eleven electoral votes, the two major parties in Illinois contended for the state's executive offices, nine seats in Congress, and, as important as anything else, control of the state legislature with the consequent privilege of naming the next United States senator. The price of these awards was popular candidates, popular issues, and carefully planned strategy.

Political strategy was very important in the Illinois campaign, the two major contestants being quite evenly matched. Success in achieving party goals might hinge on a few well-placed votes. The state was divided politically into three areas: the northern third, reliably Republican; the southern third, Egypt, overwhelmingly Democratic; and the central third, doubtful. In the northern counties and Egypt, each party tried to diminish the other's majority and to increase its own total vote as much as possible in order to offset possible reverses in the central counties. This strategy took cognizance only of the state and presidential tickets, the vote of the state as a whole. The "battleground of the campaign" was the doubtful center, into which both parties poured their best efforts. Every vote there counted toward state and presidential victory, while a

few votes' majority in any one county might determine control of the legislature. The most intensive canvassing in the state occurred in such central counties as Fulton, Morgan, and Sangamon.

The two most vital blocks of voters in the state, the Germans and the Whigs, were courted ardently by both parties. The Germans, traditionally Democratic, had gradually turned against Douglas since 1854 because of their growing conviction that his party favored slave-holders. In 1860, the Republicans appealed for the full support of this group by appointing to important party positions such Germans as Gustave Koerner, Carl Schurz, and George Schneider, and by writing into the Chicago platform two "Dutch planks" which dangled before German eyes such temporal charms as free homesteads and equal political rights for aliens. Democratic platforms were silent or vague on these matters, and the party lacked effective German leaders. The Whigs, remnants of a once potent party, were already loosely affiliated with the Republicans since many of them who supported the American party's presidential nominee in 1856 voted for the Republican state ticket that year. For the sake of the Whig vote, Republicans emphasized conservatism in 1860. The choice of Lincoln for President instead of the allegedly radical Seward, and of Yates for governor instead of Judd, may be attributed to the desire to please this group. For the same reason, the Chicago platform incorporated such Whig-favored planks as the protective tariff, internal improvements, and, despite vigorous objections of radical Republicans, a conservatively phrased anti-slavery attitude. The Democrats, finding it difficult to fraternize with a group whose traditional foe they had been, attempted to scare the Whigs from Lincoln with assertions that he was sectional, abolitionist, and disunionist, and that only Douglas could satisfy the Whig desire for a national, conservative, Union-loving candidate. Republicans replied that a Democratic party unable to maintain its own unity could not be expected to preserve national unity, and that a South angry over Douglas's nomination would hardly tolerate his election. The constant recourse by both parties in

the central counties to the opinions of the great Whig hero, Henry Clay, indicated the tremendous importance attached to the Whig vote.

The leading newspapers of 1860 reveal beyond a doubt that in Illinois the watchword of political strategy was conservatism, being anti-slavery but cautious in dealing with the institution. This was the correct attitude to impress the Illinois Whigs. For this reason, Lincoln and his party made the apparent retreat from the "house-divided" attitude, and politically wise Republican editors tried to subordinate the party's radical, often outspoken, crusading spirits to the political necessity of appearing conservative. Both parties perceived that the balance of power lay with conservative voters in the ex-Whig strongholds of the doubtful center.

As the advancing campaign indicated growing Republican strength, Lincoln's foes conceived the idea of combining to prevent his popular election, thereby devolving the choice of a President upon the House of Representatives where a Democratic-Unionist candidate would probably have been chosen. Hence, in such strategic states as New York, a fusion movement developed. This did not occur in Illinois, but there was one instance of tacit inter-party co-operation. Douglas's managers sponsored the formation of state and electoral tickets for the Bell-Everett party, apparently to prevent Whigs and Americans from voting Republican. The arrangement, however, did not defeat Lincoln.

The propaganda of the campaign was varied and the pageantry colorful. Newspapers, pamphlets, biographies and pictures of the candidates, poems and songs, mass rallies, parades, barbecues, and political speeches constituted the avenues of approach to the electorate. Both the spoken and written word were employed extensively to obtain the desired ballot-marking. Mass rallies attracted as many as seventy-five thousand persons who might listen to a dozen or more orations in a day, being entertained by parades of bands and floats and by nightly torchlight processions of "Wide-Awake" or "Ever-Ready" clubs.

Newspapers were the chief disseminators of party prop-

aganda. For Lincoln, the Chicago *Press and Tribune*. and the *Illinois State Journal* of Springfield, and for Douglas, the Chicago *Times and Herald* and the *Illinois State Register* of Springfield set the pace for many less important newspapers of the state. Both parties had German-language newspapers, and the Republicans had a few French and Swedish journals.

Mud-slinging and personal vituperation pervaded the campaign. Democrats ridiculed Lincoln's rail-splitting, occasionally controverted his acknowledged honesty, asserted his lack of patriotism in having opposed the Mexican War, and accused him of favoring racial amalgamation. Douglas, having a more conspicuous public record, suffered more personal abuse than did Lincoln. He was accused of inconsistency and hypocrisy, of having "coquetted with Mormon institutions," of having connived as a Catholic to surrender the Federal government to the Pope. Few candidates escaped campaign slanders.

Republican victories in the early October state elections in Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania pointed to Lincoln's triumph there in November, but there were no such indicators in doubtful Illinois; hence, the campaign was intensified in its final month, with increased emphasis on the legislative contest, especially in the central counties. Republicans shuttled prominent speakers to and fro across the state. Local candidates held daily rallies. Douglas, the only candidate to violate repeatedly the time-honored rule forbidding presidential nominees to deliver campaign speeches, toured his own state, holding mass meetings at Chicago, Springfield, and Centralia. When the October elections indicated his probable defeat, he turned southward to combat nobly and patriotically a dangerous secession movement, the full import of which he seemed to perceive more clearly than any other political leader of the time.

Election day, November 6, was sunny and clear, facilitating a huge popular vote. Party workers toiled throughout the day to bring out every partisan. In Springfield, Lincoln cast a ballot for all Republican candidates except his own electors. Douglas was in Alabama. On election night, telegraph

offices in principal towns were crowded by people anxious to hear the returns. When Lincoln's victory was assured, Republicans surged into wild and prolonged cheering, while Democrats found some compensation in local successes. During the next week, Republican editors gloated over the triumph, several towns staged formal celebrations, and betting partisans collected or paid off pre-election wagers.

Illinois yielded the heaviest vote in her history up to that time: 339,691, over seventy-five per cent of the eligible voters. In general, the Republicans were victorious, winning the eleven electoral votes, all state offices, four of the nine congressional seats, and control of the state legislature. Yet the triumph was not overwhelming. For President, Lincoln received 172,171, or fifty-one per cent of the votes; Douglas, 160,205, or forty-seven per cent; Bell, 4913; and Breckinridge, 2332. The popular vote for state offices varied only slightly from electoral totals. Republican control of the legislature, permitting the re-election of Senator Lyman Trumbull and assuring for the first time Republican domination of the state government, was achieved by a very slight margin, one in the senate, seven in the lower house. A change of thirteen votes in Sangamon County, eight in Edwards, ten in Madison, and twelve in Coles would have prevented a Republican legislative majority.

Lincoln's margin over Douglas was nearly twelve thousand, over all opponents about four thousand. He carried his home city by 79 votes, but lost his home county by 42 votes. Douglas lost his own state, city, and county. Lincoln carried northern Illinois by sizable majorities, Douglas carried Egypt by huge majorities, and in most central counties, Douglas won, but often by a narrow margin. Lincoln lost every county in his own congressional district. In Egypt, Republican minority strength increased over that of 1856 both in actual numbers and in proportion to the total vote there. Likewise, the Democratic minority in the northern counties increased both relatively and absolutely over that of the previous presidential poll. The huge Republican minority gains in the doubtful center, added to their majorities in the populous northern

counties, enabled the party to carry the state.[5]

Many factors accounted for the Republican victory. In the first place, Republicans were united, their foes divided. Election statistics show that the combined votes of their opponents would have defeated the Republicans neither in state nor nation, but this fact should not force the conclusion that the Democratic schism did not facilitiate Republican success. Contemporaries of both parties believed that it did. Party divisions retarded and embarrassed Douglas's campaign. Lincoln's party adopted a platform, named candidates, and was on the march a full month before the Democrats selected a standard-bearer. While Democrats were quarelling over the presidential nomination, Illinois Republicans were organizing their forces, spreading propaganda, amassing campaign funds, and holding up for public ridicule the plight of Douglas. Had Democratic unity prevailed, the party's strength at the polls would probably have been much greater.

Second, Douglas's party adopted an uncertain attitude toward campaign issues. Lincoln's party sometimes appeared inconsistent in trying to reconcile conservative and radical attitudes toward the "peculiar institution," but the fact of its being anti-slavery was scarcely questioned. The Republican platform clearly demanded free homesteads, a protective tar-

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5. The comparative strength of the four parties in different sections of Illinois may be seen in the computation of the presidential vote by congressional districts:

Northern	Lincoln		Douglas		Bell		Breckinridge	
I	21,436	70%	8,940	30%	99	0+	62	0+
II	30,856	64%	16,993	36%	192	0+	128	0+
III	30,121	60%	19,241	39%	236	0+	395	0+
IV	25,616	54%	21,115	45%	309	1	146	0+
Central								
V	14,393	45%	16,847	53%	442	1+	197	1−
VI	15,827	42%	20,875	55%	940	3	194	0+
Southern								
VII	15,788	45%	19,027	54%	468	1	66	0+
VIII	12,915	43%	16,737	55%	767	2	84	0+
IX	5,219	18%	20,430	73%	1460	5	1062	4

These totals are based on figures in the secretary of state's official election returns in the state archives of Illinois.

iff, internal improvements, and full political rights for the foreign-born. It was not certain that Douglas was pro- or anti-slavery, for or against the protective tariff and free homesteads. His own followers were sometimes bewildered over his party's policy. Though this ambiguity arose partly from Douglas's attempt to occupy a compromising position between the two sections, it undoubtedly affected public confidence in him and his party.

Third, though Lincoln's party shunned the appearance of radicalism in order to win conservative votes, the more radical anti-slavery element supported it. In the records of Lincoln and other Repulican leaders, there was ample indication that the party intended the "ultimate extinction" of slavery, even though it might avoid sudden emancipation. That this group supported Lincoln may be seen in the large majorities he received in the strongly anti-slavery northern counties.

Fourth, Lincoln probably won the German vote. The most prominent German leaders favored Lincoln, his anti-slavery pronouncements pleased their idealism, and the unequivocal Republican demands for free homesteads and equal political rights for the foreign-born appealed to their materialistic interests.[6]

Finally, the Whigs of the doubtful center supported Lincoln's party. The Republicans chose ex-Whigs for President and governor, and included traditional Whig attitudes and demands in their platform. Republican editors in the central counties constantly tried to identify Lincoln's policies with those of Clay, and incessantly combatted Democratic accusations of radicalism. The Whigs had demonstrated in 1856 that they held the balance of power when their support elected the Republican state ticket with majorities ranging from four

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6. That the Germans supported Lincoln in 1860 has been long accepted by historians. In Wisconsin, a recent study cast doubt upon this assumption: Schafer, Joseph, "Who Elected Lincoln?" **American Historical Review** (Washington, 1941), XLVII, 51-63. A recent study for Illinois tends to confirm it: Monaghan, Jay, "Did Abraham Lincoln Receive the Illinois German Vote?" Illinois State Historical Society, **Journal,** (Springfield, 1942), XXXV, 133-139. An adequate study of this problem for Illinois has not yet been made.

thousand to twenty thousand votes, while the lack of it defeated the Republican electoral ticket by over nine thousand votes. The American party, composed of Whigs and Know-nothings, gave a large percentage of the 37,531 votes for its presidential ticket to Republican state candidates. Election statistics for 1860 show that these voters were lured to the Republican electoral ticket also. For the whole state, Lincoln's party expanded the percentage of its popular vote from forty in 1856 to fifty-one in 1860, while the Democrats increased from forty-four to forty-seven per cent, and the third party dropped from sixteen to one per cent. In the northern counties, Republicans lost slightly in relation to their overwhelming strength in 1856, but in the doubtful center, one-time Whig stronghold, they gained tremendously both in actual numbers and in percentage of votes, and there was a distinct correlation between their gains and third party losses. For example, in the centrally-located fifth, sixth, and seventh congressional districts, the Republicans gained eighteen, twenty-four, and twenty-four per cent respectively over 1856, the third party lost twenty, twenty-six, and twenty-five per cent respectively, while only negligible changes occurred in the relative positions of the Democrats in the three districts.

If it can be said that any one group turned the state to Lincoln, it was the Whigs of the doubtful center. If any one strategy won for the Republicans, it was the establishment of an anti-slavery position acceptable to both radical and conservative, and enhanced by the popular appeal of free homesteads. Lincoln and his party narrowly averted defeat in Illinois. Their margin of triumph was small. The few thousand votes holding the balance of power supported the Republican party, not because it promised to free the slaves and promote human rights, but because it was committed to a desired economic development for the nation, and because its anti-slavery proposals were made to appear effective, yet cautious and Union-saving.

Bibliographical Note

The most valuable manuscript collections were the Stephen A. Douglas MSS., Harper Library, University of Chicago, and the Lyman Trumbull MSS., Library of Congress, photostats and transcripts of which are in the Illinois Historical Survey, University of Illinois. Other useful collections were the Jesse W. Fell MSS., transcripts of which are also in the Illinois State Historical Survey; the Charles H. Lanphier MSS., the John A. McClernand MSS., the Richard Yates MSS., all in the Illinois State Historical Library; and the McCormick Family MSS., McCormick Historical Society. Miscellaneous letters, some of which were of unusual value, were found in the Chicago Historical Society Collection and the Illinois State Historical Library. In a class alone stand the Lincoln letters, many of which have been published, but a few of which lie upublished in the files of the Abraham Lincoln Association. A useful aid in finding the manuscripts was the Works Progress Administration, **Guide to Depositories of the Manuscript Collections in Illinois** (Chicago, 1940).

Newspapers constituted the most bountiful source. Though many have not survived, about thirty-five complete files and fifteen partial files for 1860 were available. Newspapers of southern Illinois were scarce, but several journals of central and northern Illinois are extant.

Useful government documents were the **Eighth Census,** the **Congressional Globe,** journals of the Illinois state legislature, and the Illinois election returns in the state archives. Of the several contemporary publications available, the most useful was Halstead's **Caucuses of 1860.** The published diaries and memoirs of such men as Edward Bates, Gustave Koerner, Orville H. Browning, and Carl Schurz throw much light on the campaign. Very numerous are the published speeches and letters, and the secondary works, biographies, narrative accounts, and magazine articles that helped round out the material incorporated in this monograph.

VITA

Harold Preston James, son of the late William Franklin James and Mrs. Anna James, was born on February 25, 1912, at Des Arc, Missouri. He attended the parochial and public schools of that village, graduating from high school, however, at Piedmont, Missouri, in 1928. His undergraduate work was done at Olivet College, Olivet, Illinois, and Ball State Teachers College, Muncie, Indiana, the latter institution granting the degree of Bachelor of Science in Education in 1937. From 1937 to 1939, he taught the social sciences in the Olivet College Academy, Olivet, Illinois. Since 1940, he has taught United States history in Urbana High School, Urbana, Illinois. In February, 1940, he received the degree of Master of Arts from the University of Illinois. The title of his Master's thesis was "Some Aspects of the Latin American Policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt." He is a member of Kappa Delta Pi and Pi Gamma Mu.